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The Case for National Control
Richard Young
I have been asked to suggest for the purposes of this discussion
some of the considerations which favor national control of the Suez
Canal. Despite Mr. Laylin's eloquent presentation of the opposing
point of view, there are two sides to the question. Both deserve to be
taken into account in any analysis of an admittedly difficult and
delicate situation.
At the outset let me define what I mean by "national control"
in this context. By that term I mean effective control and jurisdiction
over the Canal and its operation by a single state-the United Arab
Republic, or, as it is easier to call it for present purposes, Egypt. Let
me make two points clear about this definition. First, national con-
trol in this sense has nothing to do with governmental versus private
ownership or operation. That question, involving among other things
the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company a decade ago, is a
different problem from the one we are discussing today. Second, the
existence of national control in this sense does not mean that Egypt
is free from international obligations relating to the Canal. I shall
come back to this point later.
In examining the case for national control, let us note first some
of the positive factors favoring national control and then some of the
difficulties attaching to international control. Perhaps thereby we
can arrive at an assessment of whether international control really
is a satisfactory and practical answer to this problem.
In the first place, the Suez Canal legally is entirely within
Egyptian territory. No international instrument relating to the Canal
casts any doubt on this. This is not the situation of an international
river or of many international straits, where there may be several
riparian states. The basic rule of international law is that a place
or an activity within a state is subject to the sovereignty, the national
control, of that state. This is elementary. But in a world still orga-
nized primarily on the basis of nation states, the rule is of funda-
mental importance. Derogations from territorial sovereignty are
exceptional in a world so organized, for they cut across the normal
patterns of state responsibility. Being anomalous, they are not readily
created and tend to be difficult to maintain. Certainly the burden
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of justifying any departure from the norm of national control must
rest on those who seek it.
National control of the Canal is thus in accord with the normal
rule of law. It is also in accord with psychological and practical
realities. Psychologically, in any country, resentment tends to arise
when foreign control is imposed on functions which are normally
within the province of the territorial sovereign. This is true no matter
how admirable or disinterested the motives for such control may be.
I need only mention the difficulties over American bases abroad or
with Panama over the Canal Zone there. And I think it is fair to say
that this is particularly true of Egypt, which has had a long history
of subjection to external controls over its finances, its judiciary, its
defense, and other aspects of its national life. Conversely, national
pride in an operation under national control can be a spur to good
performance. Most people will concede, I think, that the actual
operation of the Suez Canal during the past 10 years by the Egyptian
authorities not only surpassed all expectations in its technical com-
petence but also superior in many respects to that of the old Canal
Company.
On the practical side, the establishment of a canal regime not
subject to the territorial sovereign means a division of authority
and responsibility. Friction, evasion, non-cooperation are the likely
products of such a situation. All add up to loss of efficiency. Any
textbook on management will document this point. It needs no
elaboration except to note that the technical difficulties become com-
pounded by the political and emotional factors. The practical prob-
lems of reconciling conflicts of jurisdiction are bad enough: when
these frictions are exacerbated by the feelings of resentment I have
mentioned, the situation soon becomes not only unworkable but
potentially explosive. Hence I suggest that undivided authority over
the canal area and the canal operation is essential in principle to its
efficient and orderly management on a permanent basis; and that as
a practical matter, in the context of all the circumstances, there is in
the Suez situation no adequate substitute in the long run for the terri-
torial sovereign as the holder of this authority.
Let us now turn to look more closely at an international regime
for the Canal. Is it the panacea which it is sometimes said to be for
the problems which undoubtedly exist? Is it a practical answer for
even some of them?
We should note at the outset that it is possible to conceive of
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several different types of international regime, ranging from mere
advice or oversight by an international body, through agencies with
some powers of control, up to a complete operating organization with
quasi-governmental authority. In order to focus the discussion, I
propose to talk in terms of the latter-of an international agency
charged with the conduct of the entire Canal enterprise. This, as I
understand it, is substantially what Mr. Laylin suggests. I agree with
him that no less complete form could hope to accomplish the objec-
tives which the supporters of an international regime set as their goals.
An international regime, or perhaps better an international
administration, for the Suez Canal would, it is said, assure technical
efficiency in its operation, freedom of transit, equality of treatment,
and-in that well-worn phrase-"insulation from politics." The
phrase is a catchy one; but it reminds me of Judge Manley Hudson's
warning, "Never coin a quotable phrase: it will come back to haunt
you." The Judge was himself a notable violator of his own precept.
As to the first of these points, I would think it obvious that there
is nothing inherently more efficient about international organizations.
They may or may not be. But certainly the obstacles of language,
personnel, unclear lines of authority and responsibility, competing
national interests within the group, and so on, are high hurdles to
overcome. In this particular case, I doubt very much if an interna-
tional agency would be, at the technical level, any more efficient in
operating and improving the Canal than the Egyptian regime has
been. Indeed, it would very likely be less so. This opinion is sup-
ported, I think, by the record of experience with international admin-
istration in the past. Such administrations in general have shown
no striking competence, nor have they proved durable over any
protracted period. Examples are the international city of Tangier;
Danzig and the Saar under the League of Nations; the abortive Free
City of Trieste created under the Italian peace treaty of 1947. The
international river commissions of Europe have done useful work,
but they have had very limited operating responsibilities. And their
situation is different from Suez: there the interests of upper and
lower riparian states have had to be reconciled, and limited interna-
tional arrangements were reciprocally beneficial. Yet even in the
river commissions the record has been one of chronic conflict.'
I Baxter, The Law of International Waterways, pp. 96-106, 126-129 (1964).
I am much indebted throughout to this able study. See also Brownlie, Public
International Law, pp. 238-239 (1966).
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Freedom of transit and equality of treatment are related matters
and can be taken up together. As Professor Baxter has pointed out,
freedom of transit has two aspects: a legal right to passage, and the
physical capability of passage-i.e., a waterway so constructed and
operated as to make passage possible in fact. Both elements must
exist to make freedom of transit a reality.' I have no doubt that
under the Constantinople Convention of 1888,' as recognized and
reaffirmed in the Egyptian Declaration of 1957,' there is a general
international right to freedom of transit and equality of treatment in
the Suez Canal. This right has not been denied or abridged save in
exceptional circumstances: those arising in connection with the two
World Wars (when Britain was the dominant power in the area) 2
and those arising in connection with the Arab-Israeli hostilities of the
last two decades. In these situations the Canal has in fact been denied
to the shipping or cargoes of one or more states. The arguments as
to the legality of these actions turn in large part on the weight to be
given, in the circumstances of each case, to Article 10 of the 1888
Convention, which relates to measures for the defense of Egypt.
This controversy, I suggest, lies outside the scope of the present
discussion. The point is that freedom of transit and equality of
treatment have not been limited except in these instances by the terri-
torial sovereign; and there is no reason to think that the result would
have been any different had the Canal been under an international
administration. It will be recalled that despite the international
character which the old Canal Company used to claim for itself, free-
dom of transit was effectively abridged during its regime at the time
of both World Wars. It is also illuminating to note that the old
International Commission for the Turkish Straits, which had only
certain supervisory duties, was abolished under the Montreux Conven-
tion of 1936 and its functions transferred to Turkey, the territorial
sovereign.' The conclusion seems inevitable that regardless of the
form of regime for the Suez Canal, defense considerations must pre-
vail, because the Canal by its very situation lies athwart Egypt's lines
2 Baxter, op. cit., p. 149.
3 79 British and Foreign State Papers, pp. 18-22; English translation in U.S.
Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem, pp. 16-20 (1956).
4 U.N. Document A/3576 (24 April 1957); 51 American Journal of
International Law 673-675 (1957).
5 Wilson, The Suez Canal, pp. 138-143 (2d ed., 1939); Schonfield, The
Suez Canal in World Aflairs, pp. 69-74, 100-111 (1952).
6 Art. 24. 7 Hudson, International Legislation, p. 386.
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of communication to its eastern territories, which it is indisputably
entitled to defend if it can.
This brings us to the contention that an international regime for
the Canal will furnish it with "insulation from politics." I submit
that in relation to the Suez Canal this phrase is nonsense. It can no
more be insulated from politics in any profound sense than any
other facility or resource of world-wide importance: the world's
oil, or wheat, or the Strait of Gibraltar, or the great oceans themselves.
Even apart from the Canal, the isthmus of Suez is one of the world's
great strategic foci, a point where tremendous competing interests of
many kinds come face to face in a narrow compass. The proof is in
the history. I do not see that any international regime that could
conceivably be established under present conditions could insulate
the Canal in any meaningful way from these forces once they are
on the march.
On the contrary, I suggest that an international regime may well
give rise to additional hazards. The conflict of interests within an
international administration might further impair efficiency of opera-
tion. Problems over tolls, finances, and revenues might multiply. The
loss of a profit motive could destroy incentives to improvement and
enlargement. But of more concern, perhaps, than any of these could
be the relationship of the international canal agency to the United
Nations and to United Nations politics. The agency almost of necessity
would have to be in some kind of formal relationship to the United
Nations, whether as a "subsidiary organ" or "specialized agency" or
even as a "trust territory" administration. The UN, as we know, is a
highly political body. The political decisions, or lack of decisions,
emanating from it might well affect the management policies of the
international canal administration. Considering the present composi-
tion of the Security Council and particularly the General Assembly,
with their occasional habit of adopting resolutions of questionable
merit, who can say what pressures the canal regime might be subjected
to? And in another direction, Americans and Panamanians might
consider the possible repercussions on the Panama Canal of some
United Nations action on canals in general.
In concluding this brief review of a large subject, let me recur
for a moment to a point I mentioned at the beginning: national con-
trol does not mean the disregard of international obligations. With
respect to the Suez Canal, these obligations exist, in my opinion,
both under customary international law and as a result of conventional
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undertakings binding on Egypt-specifically, in particular, the 1888
Convention and the 1957 Declaration. I agree in general with Pro-
fessor Baxter that there is a body of international canal law applicable,
inter alia, to Suez.- This law requires, among other things, freedom
of transit and equality of treatment, subject to overriding needs of
national security. This means that Egypt has a duty to operate the
Suez Canal in conformity with these obligations. The international
community is correspondingly entitled to rely on such a canal. But
this is all.' From the international legal standpoint, the rights of the
international community are the same whether the canal regime is
national or international. International administration can give it
nothing more. If this is the situation, there is no benefit to be derived
from international control and no jurisdiction for its establishment.
My final comment relates specifically to the Arab-Israeli situa-
tion, for this is the crux of the immediate problem. Whether or not
Egypt's obligations regarding the Canal comprehend Israel depends
on the view taken of Egypt's security requirements, and the signifi-
cance of Article 10 of the 1888 Convention. Yet this situation has
had consequences for the Canal operation which have affected not
only the parties directly concerned but also the neutral commerce
of the world. The supporters of international control seek in all
sincerity to prevent the continuance of the difficulties thus created.
But for the reasons I have sought to suggest, it seems to me extremely
doubtful whether an international regime can successfully resolve these
difficulties in any permanent way. Indeed, I think it doubtful whether
it is as promising an approach as national control subject to interna-
tional obligations. The difficulties over the Canal are only one aspect
of one of the most complex and bitter international situations of our
time. To deal only with the Canal is to treat a symptom and not
the cause. Let us not delude ourselves as to where the real problems
are in that part of the world.
Questions and Answers
QUESTIONER:
I think there was a third position which both speakers left out
and which does not recognize that Israel is now sitting on one bank
7Baxter, op. cit., pp. 340-341.
1 See Obieta, International Status of the Suez Canal, pp. 107-108 (1960);
1 O'Connell, International Law, pp. 641-642 (1965).
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 1
International Control of the Suez Canal /45
of the Suez Canal, and if Mr. Young believes that Israel will go back
from that bank, I believe that he is referring to gunboat philosophy
of international law which I believe has gone out a long time ago.
There's another situation which both speakers seem to overlook.
And that is the passageway between Denmark and Sweden, Malmo
and Elsinor. Denmark and Sweden were once one country. They
were separated, and what prevented the passageway between Den-
mark and Sweden? Just the fact that you could fire a cannon ball
three miles, and nothing else. That was the control they had. Whether
you agree to nationalization in the Suez Canal, or whether you agree
to an international form of control, you must agree that every country
in the world and every person in the world should have the right of
passage on an equal basis. And there are other situations which
have come up-I'm thinking now of, for example, the Truman Doc-
trine, which said that a country is entitled to half the land, half the
land underneath the water from its coastline. 1946 Truman Doc-
trine. Yet right here on the islands of Hawaii, you have a situation
where the air space between and among the islands is federal, the
water space is partially federal and partially state. You have a barge
company which goes among the islands regulated by the state and
not the federal government, an airline which is regulated by the
federal government; and I submit that any position that we adopt
with regard to the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal will also affect
all the waterways between and among the states. And I would like
to know how both speakers can answer the question as to which
country and which people shall have access, regardless of whether they
are in peace or at war with each other? How this will be taken care
of by the proposal has not been answered to my satisfaction.
MODERATOR:
Which one wants to comment first? Mr. Laylin?
LAYLIN:
I don't have an answer.
YOUNG:
I would only say that as long as the world is in its present state
of organization, there is a recognized place in international law for
national security interests, and this, of course, is what Egypt rests
a large part of its case on. I don't know anything more I can say about
this.
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QUESTIONER:
Well, would you then stop Russian ships from traveling in the




I think there is one point that is very closely related to this.
Particularizing with Egypt, it's too bad that this point isn't applicable
there. Norway and Denmark are shipping countries. They want to
use the canal. So, it's in their own interest to treat others the way they
want to be treated. Unfortunately, the Egyptians do not have a
merchant marine that wants to go through Israeli waters. There
are no pat answers to any of these questions.
MODERATOR:
Who else has questions?
MALCOLM WILKEY, NEW YORK:
As I gather from the discussion of the two participants, prior to
any trouble arising in the navigation of the Suez Canal the net result
of national or international control would be the same. And then
during the trouble, such as the recent fighting, it would be equally
impossible for navigation or utilization of the canal. So it seems
to narrow down to which type of control would be most effective in
preventing trouble arising, and then, which type of control would
insure the restoration of normalcy after any trouble does arise. And
I suggest that to evaluate it on that basis, we might look to see whether
international control will prevent it or go some distance to help
prevent this trouble arising, and now if we have an international
body in control of the Suez Canal, would service be resumed more
rapidly than it is being at the present time?
MODERATOR:
Any comment from Mr. Laylin?
LAYLIN:
Well, in reading about the recent conflict, I've been interested
in one theory that Nasser was greatly embarrassed by the fact that
U Thant drew the United Nations troops out of that strip. He had
hoped that he could answer the goading from Syria by saying, "Well,
I have told him to withdraw them, but I can't make them do it."
Now, by the same token, I do think that international control does
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make it more difficult for countries that are at odds with one another
to have their own way. And that's one part which I think your excel-
lent presentation did not cover, and that is, the very having of that
power is an embarrassment to the person who has it.
MODERATOR:
Thank you. Any other comments on this question? Mr. Hynning?
HYNNING:
I would like to ask a question of Dick Young. He dismissed the
idea of an autonomous, corporate body for reasons given by Professor
Baxter, and I don't think he enumerated what these reasons were.
I certainly see all kinds of difficulty in trying to operate an interna-
tional canal or an international public authority of some kind under
the direct supervision of the General Assembly-this vast proliferation
of nation votes-unless we adopt Mr. Severeid's rule or some other
self-denying ordinance. But, I do think, however, that we have a very
conspicuous example of success, namely the World Bank, which doesn't
pay too much heed to the General Assembly of the U.N.; as a matter
of fact, some of you may know it is now engaged in a major legal
controversy with the General Assembly over the effect of resolutions
that are passed by these large majorities, affecting loans to South
Africa and Portugal. The Bank doesn't pay too much attention to
them. Mr. Baxter, I mean, Dick Young, I wish you would tell us why
you are dismissing the analogy of the World Bank for this kind of
international authority?
YOUNG:
I think perhaps I should make my understanding of Professor
Baxter's ideas clearer. I'm not sure that I did, judging by your ques-
tion. He dismissed in particular a form of organization which would
have been a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly-something
like the International Law Commission, or the commission on human
rights.
HYNNING:
That was not John's . . .
YOUNG:
That was not his proposal. That proposal is a proposal for a
specialized agency, which is what the World Bank is; and I agree that
,this is the most attractive form of international regime. I don't see,
however, that an international Suez Canal Corporation would neces-
sarily have the success that the World Bank has, though I have nothing
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but admiration for the World Bank. I suppose that among a number
of reasons, the most important is that the World Bank has something
that everyone wants-money-and it doesn't have to live with a
territorial sovereign, which has in a sense the ultimate say over the
corpus of the corporation. So I am not at all sure that the analogy
is a sound one. But I do agree that if we're going to have an interna-
tional regime, that's the best kind to have.
HYNNING:
I would just like to point out that I think John used the word
"autonomous" rather than "specialized agency." "Specialized agency"
can include something like UNESCO or some other thing of that
character, which is quite different in operation from the World Bank.
YOUNG:




Dick's calling the World Bank a specialized agency hasn't im-
paired its autonomy.
HYNNING:
No, that's true. If, of course, its existence came into legal being
before the U.N. did, and derives its authority from an independent
charter. Well, I think if you refer to it as a specialized agency, you
might not have the emphasis, at least to my mind, that you gave me in
using the word "autonomous." I think it would be terrible to have
this under the direct control of the General Assembly.
MODERATOR:
Question in the rear?
EDWARD FINCH, NEW YORK:
We've been talking international geopolitics here, really. Now
let's assume for a moment that this international corporation, this
autonomous, international corporation, could be a viable entity.
Where does the world of geoeconomics come into it? Would it favor
such an entity, or would it not? Would either of the speakers like
to comment on the possible economic implications if a proposal such
as this autonomous authority were further advanced and sought to be
implemented through United Nations channels, or otherwise. The
economic aspects.
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MODERATOR:
Who wants to comment first? Mr. Laylin?
LAYLIN:
It's your proposal. I'm not quite certain that I understand what
you mean by geoeconomics.
FINCH:
Well, the money from the canal-could it be used for an inter-
national police force, for example?
LAYLIN:
Oh, gracious! You mean, for other purposes?
FINCH:
No, to enforce peace in the area.
LAYLIN:




When it came to protecting it from an on-site attack, and you
would have to bring in troops from the outside. I wouldn't maintain
an army there. And if you have a world-wide conflagration, whether
it's national or international control, I agree entirely with Mr. Young.
You can't guarantee anything against that. Returning to the question
of Mr. Wilkey, the important point is, which is the more likely to
induce the settlement that is essential if either national or interna-
tional control is to work. My position is that international control
itself can help to bring about a settlement of the other disputes. Now
on the economics, I would assume that everybody would be in favor of
making it possible for the trade routes to continue as they have in the
past. And India can ship and import through the canal; and Italy
can get its oil through the canal-Italy is the one that's suffering
most, I understand, from the closing of the canal; it has to go way
around Africa and then down the Mediterranean. So the geoeconomics
would remain the same, if we understand the same thing by that word.
MODERATOR:
Somebody else over here has a question. All right, sir?
HARRY INMAN:
I would like to direct a question to either one of the gentlemen.
Has there been any thought of another means of transporting the oil
across this area, in other words, by pipeline?
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LAYLIN:
Yes, the Israelis have announced that they have spent five or six
million already, in establishing a line that will have its head, will start
at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, and then will discharge oil into
the Mediterranean. And they think that that could be commerically
competitive with the canal.
INMAN:




Oh, this is Israel.
LAYLIN:
Yes, this would be entirely Israeli territory. The territory that they
had before the 5-day war. This assumes that the Aqaba Straits. ...
MODERATOR:
This is a fascinating discussion. I'm wondering, though, if
we're not going to have to bring it to a close pretty soon. Now you
have another comment, sir?
QUESTIONER:
I have another question. Mr. Young, will you still maintain your
position of national control if another power were able to obtain con-
trol of both sides of the canal? Other than Egypt or the United Arab
Republic. Would you still be in favor of your position-I'm thinking
now of possibly a great power unfriendly to the United States, such
as Red China?
YOUNG:
Oh, I think the answer to that is that the legal principles in time
of peace certainly are the same. Now what the policy decisions
might be regarding adverse possession by an unfriendly power is
something else again. That's not a legal question at all.
MODERATOR:
I hate to cut this off, but I know of our other engagements and
responsibilities, and it's been a very interesting and fascinating discus-
sion. I think we owe these three gentlemen a real hand.
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